Trump and US Indo-Pacific Strategy

What will be the consequences of US President Donald Trump’s reckless actions on the US Indo-Pacific strategy? Though future developments in the international politics of the region depend as much on the behaviour of others as on the US, understanding the broad outlines of power relations in the region can tell us something about likely behaviour of various players and its consequences for the region. Simply put, Trump’s policies are likely to reduce US role in the region and force others to contemplate some unpalatable strategic choices.

First, the US. It is difficult to categorize Trump’s behaviour as being defined by anything as disciplined as suggested by the term “strategy”. Strategy normally encompasses a problem and means and methods by which one resolves the problem. Trump has some vague objectives—make America great again— but these are loose notions, seemingly a wish to turn the clock back to the 1950s, both domestically and internationally. He also has some equally vague notions about tariffs, exploitative allies, the efficacy of military force (short, quick ones at least), unilateral behaviours and great power politics. He has junked almost all aspects of traditional American foreign policy, including any defence of liberal values. He also has a strange fascination with the wealthy, whom he seems to see as kindred partners, and with dictators, whom he appears to fear, admire and want to emulate. Unlike his first term, when he was hemmed in by advisors from the traditional Republican political class, he is now surrounded by enablers and grifters who do little to control his asinine impulses. Thus, the first year of Trump’s second term saw wild gyrations in foreign policy but we can also see some underlying elements. Four appear to be key: all US foreign relations are decided by Trump’s personal relations, though even these are short-term and transactional; he will not recognize traditional US foreign policy’s notions of America’s friends and foes; he will mainly attack the weak, even if they are allies; and he will not commit to any significantly complicated or potentially expensive military operation.

Second, his geopolitical focus is on the Western Hemisphere. Again, this harms back to an earlier period of American dominance, which had over time become less important as the US took on global responsibilities. Trump now wants to switch from being a global power with global responsibilities to being a regional power though, as usual, this is neither consistent nor underwritten by any strategy as such. If Trump actually achieves his objectives, this will represent a voluntary and unilateral diminishing of great power role rarely seen in the annals of interstate behaviour. States, especially great powers, often try to over-expand and this could lead to downfall. It’s unheard of for a great power to withdraw in the manner Trump is attempting in the absence of significant domestic economic problems or military defeat. The only possible parallel is Ming China’s retreat from maritime power and Japan’s closing under the Tokugawa Shogunate, neither of which ended well for them.

Third, whatever the illogic of Trump’s policies, the end result is that the Indo-Pacific has and will continue to lose strategic importance, at least for the duration of Trump’s tremendous in the White House. The consequences for the region will be dire.

If the US withdraws from the region in a strategic sense—in other words, even if it is engaged economically and in other ways but takes no part in managing the military balance—China becomes the most powerful actor in the region, by far. In wealth, its Gross Domestic Product (GDP, in current US $) of US $ 19 trillion dwarfs even the combined GDP of the four noteworthy Asian powers, Japan, India, Australia and South Korea, who make up only about two-thirds of this. In military power, the story is much the same: from being a relative light-weight force that was large but poorly equipped and trained, the Chinese military forces have become leaner and a lot meaner. It now has three large aircraft carriers, with even larger nuclear-powered ones on the way. By comparison, only India has a true aircraft carrier in the rest of Asia, but it only has two, relatively light ones, in service. Japan has only two helicopter carriers, but they are even lighter though at least one can carry jump-jets such as the F-35B’s. In the air, China now either deploys or is developing several fifth generation combat jets and is even reported to be developing sixth generation fighters. China is also massively expanding its nuclear arsenal, which could potentially deter any US involvement in the region even if the US wants to continue its presence. In short, China is set to become Asia’s dominant power, if not its hegemon in the fullest sense of the word. Moreover, this is not likely to be a temporary situation but a long-lasting one because no other Asian power can hope to come anywhere close to matching China’s wealth for the next several decades.

The choice for others in the region is very limited in such a circumstance. None can match China by themselves. Indeed, the gap in wealth and military power between China and the rest of Asia is only likely to grow more in the coming decades. A recourse to nuclear deterrence may ensure basic national survival but not much else. Other than India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea could potentially build their nuclear arsenals, though time may be running out for them to make the jump. China will very likely do what the US has done, using indirect and direct threats to dissuade others in the region from going nuclear.

Combining their power in a military alliance will not help if the US is not part of such an alliance. The others are simply not rich enough or strong enough to do much even together against China. In addition, There are the usual problems of any such partnerships, especially the question of burden sharing. Which of the potential partners can help India in the Himalayas? Will India be willing to devote a part of its naval power to defend Japan, South Korea or Australia? Will these partners be willing to go to war with China to defend others? These are all hard questions that suggest the difficulty of such a regional partnership.

Alternatively, these countries—potential partners—will also be tempted to bandwagon their way out of trouble. The economic stakes of trade with China are enormous, including the threat of economic sanctions if anyone resists. Combined with the apparent futility of balancing China, band wagoning may appear to be suddenly an attractive choice. Living under China’s hegemony may be a less unpleasant than living under its boot, as historically other states have learned when facing local dominants.

How long will the change in American attitudes last? This is also an important consideration in the choices that states face in the region. If Trump is a short-term pain, there may be a temptation to wait him out. But is he? The key question is if Trump’s neo-isolationism represents a larger change in American political culture or whether this will be gone in three years, when Trump leaves office. Some form of isolationism has always been present in American strategic culture but it has always been a fringe opinion. One possibility is that Trump makes such a mess that the idea loses any domestic political credibility—which could very well be where the situation is headed to. Alternatively, if other political actors are able to give the idea some intellectual and political heft, it might lead to a fundamentally different American foreign policy and a different kind of international order.