How MAGA determines US Foreign and Defense Policy

When Donald J. Trump was elected for the second time Indian policy makers confidently asserted that they could handle him or, worst case scenario, outlast his presidency. They were wrong on both counts as India got hit with high tariffs, was accused of begging for Trump’s help to get a ceasefire, and now faces a rapidly declining Rupee which is part due to adverse terms of trade.

The reason lay in Indian policymakers not understanding what drives the MAGA coalition that voted for Trump. The vote for Trump lay in three domestic factors. First, globalization had seen Trump’s America lose well-paying jobs and make them struggle economically. A telling fact is that in the three elections Trump contested, his voting base never crossed 37% of the country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In fact, when Joe Biden won, his voters accounted for 70% of the national GDP. For Trump’s base, the economic rebuilding of America with well-paying working class jobs was of paramount importance.

Secondly, Trump’s MAGA base believes that George Bush Jr. and Barak Obama used them as cannon fodder in America’s wars and, therefore, Trump’s call to not enter future foreign conflicts resonated with them. Thirdly, Americans were concerned about the inflow immigrants because it was seen by some as shifting the demographic profile of the country towards non-whites (the so-called replacement theory) and by those who felt immigration increased criminality in the country.

These concerns of the American people are unlikely to change without a major shift in the economic fortunes of the masses and a shift in public opinion towards increased military intervention. So how then has the MAGA perception of national and international affairs shaped Trump’s foreign policy?

Trump’s tariff wars are partly based on the MAGA belief that America has been exploited by other nations on the international trade front. But there is the more important part of the strategy which is that by threatening and imposing tariffs Trump has got multiple nations to agree to invest in setting up industry (and bringing jobs) in America. Japan, South Korea, and Europe have all talked of investment in the American economy and of how this will create more well-paying jobs in the country.

On the military front, Trump has pushed the idea of hemispheric defense which focuses American defense efforts on the western hemisphere much in the way the Monroe Doctrine did in the 19^th century. The overwhelming military advantage America has over its weak North and South American neighbors mean that military disputes in the hemisphere are low-cost and will at worst amount to insignificant American casualties—the current efforts to militarily coerce Venezuela are a case in point. This does not mean, however, that America is forgoing the use of force in other parts of the world or as international relations theorists incorrectly claim, ceding unipolarity for multipolarity.

The Trump Administration has made it clear it is willing to use America’s technological superiority in military force and in 2025 it launched attacks on Iran, Yemen, Nigeria, Syria, Somalia, and in parts of the Caribbean. It is assumed that such short strikes drive the point home that you cannot cross America’s path without adverse consequences. Further, the first Trump Administration sanctioned the development of lower-yield nuclear weapons and platforms to launch them to hit hardened targets in China thereby deterring Beijing from undertaking a risky military adventure. At the same time, however, the Trump National Security Strategy wants both Japan and South Korea to spend more on defense but still views the United States as the principal security guarantor in Asia.

Similarly, while asking the Europeans to remilitarize and spend as much as 5% of GDP on defense, the Trump Administration is seeking to normalize relations with Russia and thus reduce tensions in the continent. The belief is that a grateful Russia will move away from the Chinese sphere of influence and become increasingly closer to the USA. This will lead to major investments in Russia to exploit its natural resources and, presumably, open the market to American firms. The big gamble, however, is China.

Trump recognizes the systemic challenge posed by China and has imposed tariffs as well as restrictions on technology transfers. At the same time, he knows that a prolonged trade war with Beijing is mutually destructive and that the American market needs Chinese imports to offset rising costs. Further, as witnessed by the decision to allow NVIDIA to sell chips to China, Trump is listening to his other constituency of wealthy industrialists who see the Chinese market as fueling their future profitability.

The Chinese are also willing to invest heavily in setting up industries in America precisely in those areas which are less wealthy and, therefore, Trump constituencies. It with this in mind that Trump has publicly toyed with the idea of a G2 and bipolarity even though it is clear that he would expect China to play the junior partner in this arrangement and that is something that Xi Jinping is unlikely to do. This fundamental disagreement about China’s role, coupled with the fact that the Chinese want a lasting agreement like one reached by Chairman Mao and Richard Nixon, has prevented the Xi-Trump summit that the American president so desperately seeks.

Analysts in Asia worry that if Trump and Xi can work out a way to coexist then the rest of the continent will suffer. Trump may forgo the commitment to Taiwan and essentially make it difficult for other Asian countries to hedge between Beijing and Washington. Which then brings up the question, what about relations with India?

The problem for India is that has few cards to play in its negotiations with Trump: everything it exports can be bought elsewhere; AI has made it possible to get rid of Indian H-1Bs who do entry level coding; and India at best a reluctant partner in an anti-China military grouping. There are policies that can be implemented, however, to alleviate the differences in the relationship but they will take time.

The Indian government, for example, can encourage Indian corporations to engage in Foreign Direct Investment in the United States. The Mahindras, for example, set up a tractor factor in rural Georgia which has proved extremely beneficial to the citizens of the state. Other such investments should be encouraged to give Indian businesses a stronger profile in the United States and to get it more advocates within the American business community and Trump’s MAGA base.

The other possibility is to present a mutually beneficial proposal to Trump like an agreement on pharmaceuticals. The American public is being hurt by the rising cost of prescription drugs and getting Trump to invest in setting up Indian factories to manufacture drugs would provide a cheap supply of pharmaceuticals while raising employment in India.

The more important thing to remember, however, is that MAGA is a structural feature of the American economy and society and its supporters are unlikely to go away in the near future. Given this fact, and the constraints on India’s political leadership, one must recognize that this factor will shape India-US relations well beyond the Trump years for even if a Democrat is elected president, it will not change the mindset of the voting public. India, therefore, has to look beyond a potential US-India strategic partnership to a foreign policy which gives greater prominence to Russia, China, and the European Union.